SOCIAL CONTRACT: THE DISTRIBUTIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF A NATIVE NATION’S PATENT AGREEMENT WITH ALLERGAN by Monjar, Anne
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 3
2018
SOCIAL CONTRACT: THE DISTRIBUTIVE
SIGNIFICANCE OF A NATIVE NATION’S
PATENT AGREEMENT WITH ALLERGAN
Anne Monjar
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, Northwestern University
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Anne Monjar, SOCIAL CONTRACT: THE DISTRIBUTIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF A NATIVE NATION’S PATENT AGREEMENT
WITH ALLERGAN, 16 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 107 (2018).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol16/iss2/3
© 2018 by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
 
 
N O R T H W E S T E R N 
J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y 
A N D 




SOCIAL CONTRACT: THE DISTRIBUTIVE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF A NATIVE NATION’S 










November 2018  VOL. 16, NO. 2 
Copyright 2018 by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Volume 16, Number 2 (2018) 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 
107 
Notes 
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PATENT AGREEMENT WITH ALLERGAN 
Anne Monjar1 
 
ABSTRACT—In 2017, pharmaceutical giant Allergan announced an 
innovative new agreement with the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe of upstate 
New York. Allergan was to transfer ownership of the patent of its successful 
dry eye drug Restasis to the Tribe in exchange for an exclusive licensing 
agreement. The hope was that the Tribe’s sovereign immunity would protect 
Allergan’s patent from validity challenges, in which the patent was already 
embroiled, while allowing them to retain its profits.  
The agreement drew immediate outrage from policymakers who saw 
the agreement as a multi-billion-dollar corporation exploiting a legal 
loophole to unfairly secure its monopoly. Ultimately, the courts agreed – the 
Federal Circuit recently denied the Tribe’s assertion of tribal immunity in a 
validity challenge against Restasis.  
 While the agreement rightfully did not survive legal challenge, there are 
aspects to it that are worth considering against a backdrop of utilitarian 
theories of intellectual property. In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
utilitarian justifications for patent protections have come to overshadow 
earlier distributive theories, which prioritized the public benefits over 
individual property rights. The Allergan-Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe 
agreement may not be a true distributive model of intellectual property. 
However, the ways in which the agreement required the transfer of a title 
from private ownership to a community, a community that did not 
traditionally benefit from the intellectual property system, are reminiscent of 
distributive protections that would greatly improve our increasingly 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, pharmaceutical heavyweight Allergan announced an unusual 
contract with the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe of upstate New York.2 Allergan 
was transferring ownership of its patent in the dry eye drug Restasis to the 
Tribe in exchange for an exclusive licensing agreement.3 Through this 
venture, Allergan hoped to secure the patent, assuming that the Tribe’s 
sovereign immunity would protect the patent from validity challenges by 
other pharmaceutical companies.4 There was strong backlash against the 
arrangement, which lawmakers and consumer advocates saw as the attempt 
of a multibillion-dollar company to maintain an illegitimate monopoly 
through a legal loophole, keeping more affordable, innovative medicine out 
of the market for longer.5 
Ultimately, both the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) and the 
Federal Circuit agreed, denying the Tribe’s claim of sovereign immunity.6 
But while the agreement did not survive legal challenge, there are aspects to 
it that, when considered in conjunction with the rise of utilitarian 
justifications for intellectual property, were more progressive than they 
might have appeared. There has long existed a tension between distributive 
and utilitarian theories of intellectual property, with the distributive 
philosophy giving way in the latter half of the twentieth century to a 
“property right”-centric view.7 There remain, however, legal mechanisms 
that can check the utilitarian tendencies of modern intellectual property 
 
 2 Katie Thomas, How to Protect a Drug Patent? Give It to a Native American Tribe, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/health/allergan-patent-tribe.html?mcubz=3
&_r=1. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Sovereign Immunity and the Intellectual Property System, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 6 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 7 See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Hidden Though Flourishing Justification of Intellectual Property 
Laws: Distributive Justice, National Versus International Approaches, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 23 
(2017). 
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rights and ensure both competitive markets and public well-being. The 
Allergan arrangement, though too exclusive to be a true “distributive” model 
of a patent right, featured some distributive mechanisms. The redirection of 
revenue from a lucrative patent to a population otherwise not served by the 
intellectual property system is an end worth pursuing in our 
conceptualization of intellectual property rights, and one to meditate on 
despite the shortcomings of this unusual arrangement. 
I. THE ALLERGAN-SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE AGREEMENT 
The Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe lies an hour and a half southwest of 
Montreal, just below the Saint Lawrence River, an island-spotted stretch of 
waterway winding northeast from the Great Lakes to Quebec, dividing the 
U.S. and Canada.89 The heavily forested, frigid landscape is home to just over 
3,000 people who consider themselves part of a larger Mohawk community 
comprising Canadian tribal lands as well.10 Like many native nations in the 
U.S., the Saint Regis Tribe, formally recognized as a sovereign entity by the 
federal government in the 1960s, relies on a local casino for economic 
sustainability.11 Still, the reservation struggles with poverty, with a median 
income that falls well below the national median.12 
But the Saint Regis Tribe recently undertook a new economic initiative, 
one that brought them into the spotlight in both medical and legal fields. The 
Tribe has taken advantage of a questionable idiosyncrasy in the patent 
system to tap, rather easily, into a rich source of annual income. 
On September 8, 2017, the pharmaceutical company Allergan, a global, 
multibillion-dollar company boasting such products as Botox, announced it 
 
 8 SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/RV5B-63WX]. 
 9 Saint Lawrence River, BRITANNICA.COM, https://www.britannica.com/place/Saint-Lawrence-
River (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8D8F-GPRC]. 
 10 St. Regis Mohawk Reservation, Franklin County, New York: Census 2010 Total Population, 
AMERICAN FACTFINDER, https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/cf/1.0/en/place/St. Regis Mohawk 
Reservation, Franklin County, New York/POPULATION/DECENNIAL_CNT (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/B3T6-88B8]. 
 11 Culture and History, SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-
nsn.gov/culture_and_history (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/U78A-FMK6]; Economic 
Impact, SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/resolve-the-boundary/economic-
impact (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/F9JG-DANF]. 
 12 See Selected Economic Characteristics 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year 
Estimates: St. Regis Mohawk Reservation, Franklin County, New York, AMERICAN FACTFINDER, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/ACS/16_5YR/DP03/0600000US3603364727 (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/46BX-PNYV]; Income and Poverty in the United States: 2015, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.html (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/84FB-FLZK]. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
110 
had entered into an arrangement with the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.13 
Allergan would be transferring one of its many patents to the Tribe, a dry 
eye drug called Restasis.14 Once the Tribe took ownership of the patent, it 
would grant exclusive licensing rights to Allergan, who would distribute and 
market the drug.15 For the transfer, Allergan paid the tribe $13.75 million.16 
As for the annual licensing fee, it would pay another $15 million a year.17 
Under the ownership of the Tribe, Allergan believed that the patent would 
be protected from validity challenges by the Tribe’s sovereign Indian Nation 
status.18 The company was unequivocal about its motives. “The Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe and its counsel approached Allergan with a sophisticated 
opportunity to strengthen the defense of our RESTASIS® intellectual property 
in the upcoming inter partes review proceedings before the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board,” the Chief Legal Officer stated in a press release, referring to 
an ongoing validity challenge to Restasis.19 
The PTAB, created by the America Invents Act (AIA), adjudicates 
patent validity challenges through its inter partes review process (IPR).20 The 
idea behind PTAB was to create a more efficient, streamlined process for 
reviewing patent validity without a petitioner needing to file a lawsuit.21 To 
prevail on a claim of patent invalidity, the petitioner only needs to 
demonstrate, “by [a] preponderance of the evidence,” that the patent is 
invalid—an easier threshold to meet than the “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard required in federal court.22 Once the PTAB issues a 
decision, the petitioner is estopped from raising patent validity in any 
subsequent lawsuits.23 Because it is now easier to successfully challenge 
 
 13 Our Products, ALLERGAN, https://www.allergan.com/products/key-products/specialty-products 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2JZ6-VM2F]; see also Thomas, supra note 2. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Announce Agreements Regarding RESTASIS® Patents, 
ALLERGAN, https://www.allergan.com/news/news/thomson-reuters/allergan-and-saint-regis-mohawk-
tribe-announce-agr (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6VY4-UPMK]; see also Thomas, supra 
note 2. 
 20 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 311 (2012); see also Adam Davidson, Why Is Allergan Partnering with the St. 
Regis Mohawk Tribe? NEW YORKER (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2017/11/20/why-is-allergan-partnering-with-the-st-regis-mohawk-tribe [https://perma.cc/3MTQ-D87V]. 
 21 Joseph Lavelle, The Impact of Inter Partes Review on Patent Litigation, DLA PIPER: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY NEWS (Sept. 4, 2013), https://www.dlapiper.com/
en/us/insights/publications/2013/09/the-impact-of-inter-partes-review-on-patent-liti__/ 
[https://perma.cc/2RXT-8MK7]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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patent invalidity through IPR, a patent immune from such a challenge is 
much more valuable to its holder.24 Critically, the provision of the AIA 
outlining IPR is written such that it does not clearly apply to sovereign 
entities, like states or Native American nations.25 With the patent actually 
belonging to the Tribe, Allergan thought it would be immunized from 
revocation by the PTAB. Because of the licensing agreement, Allergan 
would be the sole recipient of Restasis’s revenue through its 2024 expiration 
date.26 
Other pharmaceutical companies were, unsurprisingly, intrigued. A 
representative from Teva Pharmaceutical stated the company would be 
“interested” to see the response of regulatory agencies.27 Government 
officials were far less receptive to the arrangement, which they saw as a 
multibillion-dollar company greedily skirting patent rules and regulations 
and exploiting tribal law. Within weeks, Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) 
issued a statement condemning the deal and vowed to make Congress “close 
loopholes that drug companies exploit to avoid competition.”28 On 
November 2, 2017, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Internet convened for the Sovereign Immunity 
and the Intellectual Property System Hearing, where witnesses from private 
industries, trade associations, and academia opined on the dangers of the 
Allergan precedent.29 The chairman of the Subcommittee, Bob Goodlatte (R-
VA), stated that he “share[d] the concern about the recent instances of private 
companies paying to ‘rent’ sovereign immunity of Native American tribes to 
protect their intellectual property. Tribal sovereign immunity was never 
intended to serve the interests of private companies unrelated to the tribes.”30 
The contract, the consensus seemed to be, was an abuse of tribal sovereignty 
that damaged the intellectual property system. When invalid patents remain 
in place, public welfare suffers; an expensive brand-name drug may 
dominate a market while a company with a more affordable, generic version 
must wait until the patent expires rather than point out the patent’s 
shortcomings. (That is, in fact, the case with Allergan; drugmakers Teva and 
Mylan filed applications to challenge the validity of the Restasis patent. They 
 
 24 Davidson, supra note 20. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Thomas, supra note 2. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Jan Wolfe, U.S. Senator Slams Allergan Patent Deal with Native-American Tribe, REUTERS (Sept. 
20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-allergan-patents/u-s-senator-slams-allergan-patent-
deal-with-native-american-tribe-idUSKCN1BQ2BE [https://perma.cc/4D3Y-CNG3]. 
 29 Sovereign Immunity and the Intellectual Property System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 30 Id. (statement of Bob Goodlatte, Chairman Comm. on Judiciary). 
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notified the PTAB of their plans to create a generic drug.31 Allergan sued 
Teva and Mylan for infringement while the validity challenge was 
underway.32) 
Predictably, Mylan Pharmaceuticals filed an IPR proceeding against the 
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, providing the PTAB an opportunity to set the 
record straight on the scope of IPR.33 The PTAB held that an IPR proceeding 
is more like a federal administrative proceeding than a lawsuit, and that 
therefore the Saint Regis Tribe could not assert tribal immunity.34 The Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.35 
Legally, Mylan Pharmaceuticals closed the loophole of tribal 
immunity. And supporters of a dynamic medical research and development 
market that creates effective, affordable treatments for consumers probably 
support this solution, too. Yet, there are nuances to this arrangement that 
ought to give us pause in condemning it. Not the least of which were the 
benefits the patent transfer provided to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe—a 
steady source of revenue to boost its ailing economy.36 Though we might 
think Allergan was taking unfair advantage of a systemic loophole by 
entering into this agreement, it is harder to fault the Saint Regis Tribe for 
finding and taking a meaningful economic opportunity for its community. 
Tribal sovereignty as we know it today is, after all, a legal status conferred 
upon native communities in recognition of the displacement and 
dispossession experienced by generations of indigenous peoples at the hands 
of colonial powers.37 Tribal rights to self-determination have been contested, 
withdrawn, and circumscribed by federal and state governments since the 
early days of the republic.38 The legislation that currently allows for and 
governs their independent status, the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C.A. § 5301, is always subject to 
 
 31 Joe Mullin, Judge Wants to Know if Allergan’s Tribal Patent Deal Is a “Sham”, ARS TECHNICA 
(Oct. 10, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/judge-wants-to-know-if-allergans-tribal-
patent-deal-is-a-sham/ [https://perma.cc/4TPG-JEAJ]. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, 2018 WL 1100950, at *6 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 
2018). 
 34 Id. at *7. 
 35 Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 36 Economic Development, SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/economic-
development (last visited Nov. 5, 2018) [https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/economic-development]. 
 37 Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-
Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 38 Id. at 3–4. 
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Congressional amendment or even revocation.39 In other words, tribes are 
only as sovereign as the federal government allows them to be.40 
Furthermore, there has long existed a tension between current 
intellectual property laws and Indian tribes’ rights to secure, protect, and 
preserve their cultures. Trademark law is the area where this conflict has 
played out the most. In 1990, Congress amended the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 305, to allow trademark protection for individual Indians 
and tribes.41 The law has paved the way for some high-profile challenges to 
the use of native names and icons, including the Oglala Lakota Tribe’s 
challenge to the use of Crazy Horse’s name on alcoholic beverages,42 and the 
Navajo Nation’s challenge of Urban Outfitters’ use of the Navajo name on 
more than twenty products.43 Moreover, “biopiracy” remains a controversy 
in patent law: the commercialization of Native American knowledge of 
plants’ medicinal properties in mainstream pharmaceuticals.44 Indigenous 
peoples have not, historically, received any direct benefits from the 
intellectual property system.45 
While the dissolution of this agreement will certainly have an impact 
on a disadvantaged community, we should also pause to consider the nature 
of the transaction itself. Allergan essentially transferred its own patent title 
to another party and, in the process, distributed the rewards it would have 
received from that patent to the other party. To be sure, the revenue the Saint 
Regis Tribe would have received from Allergan was a small fraction of total 
profits made from Restasis.46 However, the shift in ownership of this patent 
is significant in relation to the longer story of how patent rights have become 
property rights, overshadowing distributive theories of intellectual property. 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Robert J. Miller, American Indian and Tribal Intellectual Property Rights, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 179, 180 (2010). 
 42 Id. at 181. 
 43 David Schwartz, Navajo Nation Settles Trademark Suit Against Urban Outfitters, REUTERS (Nov. 
18, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-navajo-urbanoutfitters/navajo-nation-settles-trademark-
suit-against-urban-outfitters-idUSKBN13D2QA [https://perma.cc/9YRD-5PBK]. 
 44 Laurie Anne Whitt, Indigenous Peoples, Intellectual Property & the New Imperial Science, 23 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 211, 247 (1998). 
 45 See generally Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property and Indigenous Peoples, 95 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 143, 143 (2001). 
 46 Thomas, supra note 2. 
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II. “DISTRIBUTIVE” V. PROPERTY RIGHT THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
The legal understanding of the role of intellectual property rights 
underwent a sea change in the latter half of the twentieth century. Patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks historically served the greater end of 
incentivizing creativity and innovation for the benefit of the public.47 The 
Supreme Court articulated this idea in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken: “The ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity 
for the general public good.”48 An intellectual property right was granted 
only insofar as it would “‘enlarge’ the creative pie.”49 The patent system also 
expressed this value, operating primarily as an incentive-based system for 
societal advancements.50 Jerome H. Reichman describes the structure of 
intellectual property rights in the early twentieth century as “islands of 
protection in a sea of free competition”; intellectual property was to enhance 
competition and innovation, not stifle it.51 Rochelle Dreyfuss and Susy 
Frankel expound on this theory: 
Debates in the literature, in policy circles, and in courts were primarily 
quantitative, concerned with how much exclusivity was needed to balance the 
interest in protection against the access needs of the public. . . . Thus, while the 
subject matter of protection may have been expanding, there were many ways 
in which governments retained significant flexibilities to contour the 
“continent” to benefit the public.52 
The laws and treaties comprising domestic and global intellectual 
property policy reflected this view, too. The Berne and Paris Conventions 
referred to the individual vested with an intellectual property right as an 
“author,” as opposed to later treaties that referred to “rights-holders” and 
“owners.”53 Similarly, both Berne and Paris allowed member nations 
flexibility to maintain public-protective policies in spite of the obligation to 
protect foreign works.54 Under Berne, for example, states were permitted to 
translate books into local languages without the author’s permission.55 
 
 47 Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How International 
Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 557–58 (2015). 
 48 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). 
 49 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1539 
(2005). 
 50 Dreyfus & Frankel, supra note 47. 
 51 Jerome H. Reichman, Nurturing a Transnational System of Innovation, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
POL. 143, 145 (2007). 
 52 Dreyfus & Frankel, supra note 47, at 558. 
 53 Id. at 564. 
 54 Id. at 563. 
 55 Id. 
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In recent years, the conceptualization of intellectual property rights, and 
the rhetoric used to describe them, has focused on walling off property rights 
from outside users. We have confused the ends of intellectual property rights 
with the means; the value of a patent, for instance, comes not from the 
benefits of the innovation it protects, but from the patent itself—that is, the 
exclusive monopoly bestowed by the patent. The “right to exclude” has 
matched or exceeded the public benefit as the value driving intellectual 
property enforcement. A number of factors have driven this shift in mindset, 
including the globalization of trade and the accompanying view of 
intellectual property as a commodity and an asset rather than a tool with 
which to increase the number and quantity of commodities and assets.56 
The 1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS), for instance, strengthened existing intellectual property rights, 
mandated enforcement mechanisms in participating states, and diminished 
the ability of states to protect local interests.57 Under the Paris Convention, 
countries could require patent grantees to “work the invention” in that 
locality to create further industry in that jurisdiction; TRIPS constrains such 
allowances.58 Additionally, TRIPS obligates all member states to vigorously 
enforce intellectual property rights through injunctions, monetary awards, 
and the seizure of infringing goods.59 Member countries must impose 
criminal penalties for willful infringement.60 And any flexibilities or 
perceived weaknesses in TRIPS have been tightened by subsequent 
international agreements like WIPO and the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement.61 According to Dreyfuss and Frankel, “the changes create new 
norms regarding the appropriate level of protection and excludability and an 
unraveling of the incentive-based rationale for protection.”62 
These shifts in global trade law, too, have occurred against the backdrop 
of a law and economics-based justification for the rise of intellectual 
property rights.63 This theory focuses on efficiency and utilitarianism.64 
Social welfare, through this lens, is the economic maximization of scientific 
 
 56 Id. at 558. 
 57 Id. at 563–65. 
 58 Id. at 563. 
 59 Id. at 564. 
 60 Id. at 564–65. 
 61 Id. at 566–67. 
 62 Id. at 570. 
 63 Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 7 (“Over the years, the utilitarian-economic-efficiency theories of the 
law and economics approach have been widely cited as the dominant justification for the exclusive 
allocation of intellectual property rights to financial stakeholders.”). 
 64 Id. 
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and cultural goods.65 One of the consequences of this focus, writes Shlomit 
Yanisky-Ravid, is that incentives are now, more often than not, given to 
firms and employers rather than individuals.66 This dynamic, he writes, is at 
odds with the distributive value of intellectual property, which ought to be 
used as a mechanism for a just allocation of resources.67 Peter Lee similarly 
argues that “strict exclusive rights” dampen the distributive effects of 
patents; he criticizes the utilitarian goals of “allocating resources to 
maximize aggregate welfare” and advocates distributive justice as “a 
normative principle favoring equality of access in resource allocation.”68 
Margaret Chon reaches roughly the same assessment, arguing that the 
emphasis on utility maximization “ignores distributional consequences.”69 
The pharmaceutical industry is perhaps the most paradigmatic example 
of an industry realizing the consequences of a utilitarian-based intellectual 
property rationale. Prescription drugs and other medical treatments are more 
expensive than ever, pricing many consumers out of proper healthcare.70 As 
Lee notes: 
[P]atents enable supracompetitive prices for medicines, diagnostic agents, and 
agricultural innovations. . . . Patented drugs can be vastly more expensive than 
generic equivalents. As noted, the average worldwide price for ARVs 
[antiretrovirals] that treat HIV/AIDS decreased by two orders of magnitude 
upon expiration for key patents. . . . Patent-enabled access constraints, which 
raise prices for all consumers, have clear implications for distributive 
justice. . . .71 
 
 65 Id.; see also Brett Frischmann, Capabilities, Spillovers, and Intellectual Progress: Toward a 
Human Flourishing Theory for Intellectual Property, 14(1/2) REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 1, 
14–15 (2017) (distinguishing between traditional utilitarian welfare economics, in which aggregate 
welfare of society is measured by utility, happiness, pleasure, preference satisfactions, or some 
comparable measure, and the capabilities approach that seeks to escape welfare maximization as the end 
by rejecting exclusive reliance on conventional economic measures and replacing them with the 
opportunities to realize actual, “real-life” achievements). 
 66 Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 7, at 20 (“The beneficiaries of this intellectual property rights 
allocation have been supported by United States courts, which validate contracts transferring intellectual 
property rights to firms, employers, or other economically oriented entities, thereby diluting—to the point 
of destruction—the rights of authors and inventors, especially in the case of employee-inventors and 
creators.”). 
 67 Id. at 19. 
 68 Peter Lee, Toward A Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917, 921 (2009). 
 69 Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 
2832 (2006). 
 70 Aimee Picchi, Prognosis for Rx in 2017: More Painful Drug-Price Hikes, CBS NEWS (Dec. 30, 
2016), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-prices-to-rise-12-percent-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/
5YYZ-5ZJY]. 
 71 Lee, supra note 68, at 931–32. 
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When generic drug companies, like those challenging Allergan’s 
patents, can’t enter the market due to a preexisting patent, the patented drug 
can be priced as high as the patent owner likes. In addition to Lee’s ARV 
example, pharmaceutical companies have come under fire recently for 
increasing the price of EpiPens,72 muscular dystrophy treatments,73 and 
heroin overdose antidotes.74 
The creation of the PTAB was, in fact, an effort to provide a more 
efficient avenue for challenges to patents and for patent holders to appeal 
adverse decisions.75 Rather than litigate in federal court, a plaintiff may 
challenge the validity of the patent through an IPR, looking to prior art to 
determine whether the challenged patent is obvious or anticipated.76 And 
while the Board has provided a venue to hear patent claims without clogging 
the federal court system, it has not changed the fundamental nature of patent 
rights as they stand today. A patent, even a valid one, can hold up the entry 
of generic drugmakers for twenty years.77 
While efforts to loosen the sanctions dictated by TRIPS and WIPO have 
stalled, there is some effort in the international arena to refocus global 
intellectual property protections to more distributive ends.78 In 2004, for 
instance, the WIPO General Assembly called for several initiatives: a 
moratorium on expanding intellectual property rights, more attention paid to 
the social and economic costs of stringent intellectual property protections, 
and “non-proprietary systems of creativity and innovation, such as 
Wikipedia.”79 The Assembly also proposed a Treaty on Access to 
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Knowledge that outlines potential exceptions to patent protection for certain 
types of subject matter.80 
At the most global levels of lawmaking, the human consequences of 
aggressive intellectual property protections and the importance of 
distributive outlets in the intellectual property system are being 
acknowledged. It is against this backdrop that the Allergan-Saint Regis 
Mohawk agreement takes on unique significance as a quasi-distributive legal 
instrument. 
III. DISTRIBUTIVE SOLUTIONS 
There are strong historical and contemporary examples of legal 
mechanisms designed to enhance public access while also conferring 
protection on patent owners. Examining these arrangements offers insight 
into how other countries have protected the public interest in the face of 
patent protections, and how some version of the Allergan arrangement might 
fit into that framework. 
A. Working Requirements 
The first of these is known as a “patent working requirement,” a 
condition of patent rights that the holder “work” the patent in any jurisdiction 
where its rights are enforced.81 To work a patent might mean to simply import 
the good into the area of protection or to manufacture it there.82 Working 
requirements originated in English common law, where royal patents were 
sometimes granted to foreigners who were willing to teach locals how to use 
the art.83 These early patent conditions, writes Marketa Trimble, “were 
consistent with the countries’ initial approaches to their patent systems, 
which were guided by the notion that patents were expected to serve 
domestic industry.”84 Simply put, to be granted the privileges of intellectual 
property protection, one was expected to give back to the community in 
which they received them. 
TRIPS has arguably limited the right of member states to impose 
working requirements through the provision of the agreement that prohibits 
discrimination based on the place of invention.85 However, that theory is as 
yet untested, and many countries still have some form of a working 
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requirement, including India and Brazil.86 Trimble argues that the U.S. 
requirement that patent claims “enable” future inventors and detail the “best 
mode” of creation are aimed at similar goals of enhanced domestic industry.87 
B. Compulsory Licensing 
In Thailand, regulators have taken the bold step of issuing compulsory 
licenses to protect public health.88 Thailand has a national mandate to provide 
accessible healthcare to its citizens, and is permitted by flexibilities in TRIPS 
to issue licenses to the extent necessary to protect public health.89 In 2006, 
after taking steps to negotiate with the owner of a patent that treats 
HIV/AIDS without success, Thailand authorized its Government 
Pharmaceutical Organization to manufacture generic versions.90 The move 
drew ire from major patent holders, but as Cynthia Ho writes, “Thailand 
believes in a public interest orientation to patent rights with the view that 
patients must come before profits.”91 
Even in the U.S., there are still ways that the patent system uses public-
oriented, distributive methods to enhance public health. In instances where 
the innovation is the product of taxpayer funding, at either the state or federal 
level, there are ways in which the government can require the resulting patent 
to benefit the residents that funded it, though they are often hesitant to do 
so.92 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, for instance, allows recipients of federal 
funding to take title to their taxpayer-funded inventions.93 However, the Act 
focuses on promoting the “utilization of inventions,” “free competition and 
enterprise” without unduly encumbering future research and discovery, and 
“public availability.”94 Access is key. As Peter Lee points out, the National 
Institute of Health (NIH) cites these provisions in their guidelines, stating 
 
 86 Id. at 496–97. 
 87 See id. at 499. 
 88 Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047, 1065–66 
(2009). 
 89 Id. Theoretically, any country is authorized to do so. Id. at 1067 (“Contrary to the bluster of 
pharmaceutical giants, compulsory licenses are an essential part of national and international laws. The 
WTO rules allow member states to issue compulsory licenses to protect public health according to their 
own criteria; indeed, the Doha Public Health Declaration clearly affirms that each country has the 
‘freedom to determine the grounds upon which compulsory licenses are granted.’”). 
 90 Id. at 1066–67. 
 91 Id. at 1066; see also Thailand Issues Compulsory License for Patented Aids Drug, INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Dec. 13, 2006), https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-
news/bridges/news/thailand-issues-compulsory-licence-for-patented-aids-drug [https://perma.cc/9QTL-
CQM6]. 
 92 See generally Lee, supra note 68, at 944–46. 
 93 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012)). 
 94 Id. § 200. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
120 
that when NIH funding recipients take title to their inventions, they have 
“obligations to promote utilization, commercialization, and public 
availability of these inventions.”95 A separate provision of Bayh-Dole, 35 
U.S.C. § 202(a), though rarely acted on, in fact allows funding agencies to 
refuse the issuance of a patent in “exceptional circumstances” when doing 
so would “better promote the policy and objectives of the Act.”96 
Similarly, in the State of California, recipients of state biomedical 
research funding have a number of distributive obligations attached to any 
title they take.97 In 2004, the state passed Proposition 71, creating the 
California Institute for Regenerative Medicine (CIRM), which administers 
grants for biomedical research—specifically, stem cell research.98 Recipients 
of CIRM grants are allowed to take title to their inventions, but must engage 
in a revenue-sharing model with the Institute and guarantee that any 
treatment resulting from CIRM-funded research will be available to the 
state’s uninsured.99 “At its core,” Lee writes, “Proposition 71 is a public 
health initiative.”100 
It is important to note that these rules circumscribing patent 
protection—a working requirement, a compulsory license, or other 
accessibility requirements—are attached to patents. They are considered part 
of the privilege granted by the intellectual property system, not exceptions 
to an otherwise inviolate property right. Within these frameworks, patents 
are not wholly exclusionary rights, but inherently distributive mechanisms 
that balance certain inventors’ rights with the public good. The patent holder 
has an affirmative duty to the public to distribute the benefits of his creation 
to society in an equitable, accessible manner. 
IV. THE ALLERGAN-SAINT REGIS AGREEMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTIVE 
MODEL 
The arrangement between Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe 
was hardly a paragon of distributive values at work in the intellectual 
property system. The agreement was, in some ways, quite asymmetrical in 
the benefits it bestowed on the tribe compared to the lucrative right retained 
by Allergan. The licensing fees paid to the Tribe by Allergan would have 
been, after all, a small percentage of the annual revenue the drug will likely 
make for the company, to say nothing of the added value of insulation from 
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a validity challenge.101 More importantly, the licensing right given to 
Allergan was exclusive, giving the company the sole ability to manufacture, 
distribute, and sell (at any price it liked) the drug in question.102 
Still, fundamentally, the arrangement mimicked the kind of distributive 
mechanisms we might imagine for a patent system that mandated public 
benefits as a condition of protection. The Saint Regis Tribe agreed to act as 
a type of trustee for Restasis, ensuring its safekeeping from challenge and 
Allergan’s continued revenue from it; in exchange for that protection, 
Allergan distributed some of its profits to the Tribe.103 In the same way a 
working requirement insists on benefits for the communities protecting the 
patents, or a CIRM-funded patent insists on revenue sharing by its holder, 
Allergan was required to share a piece of its fortune to receive the kind of 
protection it wanted. 
Perhaps even more significantly, Allergan gave up its ownership of 
Restasis to receive full protection. Under this scheme, protection is not 
synonymous with ownership, and one does not imply the other. Its 
development of Restasis merely gave Allergan a privilege in its licensing. 
To be sure, that privilege was more exclusionary than a true distributive 
method would be. But Allergan was forced to relinquish possession of its 
patent and distribute some of the benefits of that possession to the Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe, a community that almost certainly would not 
otherwise benefit from the intellectual property system. Despite the 
exclusionary, lopsided nature of the agreement, it bespeaks more distributive 
value than is often found in our patent system. 
We might imagine arrangements that feature the distributive aspects of 
this arrangement—the automatic transfer of title, the revenue sharing, and 
the benefits to underserved population—without its exclusionary attributes, 
and without its effect of insulating the patent from challenge. It is also 
possible to imagine schemes that might distribute the benefits of the Restasis 
patent more broadly. In the spirit of early working requirements, Allergan 
might be asked to open a clinic in the sovereign entity giving refuge to its 
patent, for instance. Or the licensing arrangement between the tribe and 
Allergan might be less exclusionary, granting Allergan some exclusive 
privileges for a provisional period, then opening the patent up to wider 
manufacturing. 
While Allergan was, probably rightly, barred from opening and 
exploiting this legal loophole to protect itself, the nuances of their escape 
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from the system are illuminating. They have, after all, bargained for 
protection by fulfilling a social duty to those offering that protection. 
 
